Founder-side M&A for software, AI & IP.

My preferred range is approximately $1M–$5M in annual recurring revenue (ARR), with scope up to roughly $10M ARR. I work with founder-led SaaS, AI, and software companies where a specific buyer could gain a useful capability, customer connection, or product advantage through an acquisition.

I also selectively represent pre-revenue technology and software IP. A working product, meaningful technical depth, clear ownership, and a credible acquire-versus-build case matter more than an ambitious asking price. Sometimes a paid deployment or ownership cleanup is the better next step before a sale process.

An initial review covers the product, users, revenue, ownership, timing, previous buyer conversations, and the outcome you would accept. I also consider whether the likely proceeds, fees, and work make an engagement worthwhile for both of us.

I start with what is actually being acquired: the company, a product, selected code and IP, customer relationships, or technology with a team joining the buyer. Then I assess the commercial evidence and what a specific acquirer could reasonably gain by owning it. For a recurring-revenue business, growth quality, retention, margins, concentration, and operating costs help establish the picture.

Earlier-stage software often needs a more specific case: difficult engineering already completed, a working implementation, useful IP, or development time the buyer could save. Asking price and effort invested are not enough on their own. Relevant transaction comparisons can inform the discussion where reliable data exists; a generic multiple rarely explains the whole opportunity.

We also compare payment structures. Cash at closing, deferred payments, earnouts, equity, and founder obligations can make similar headline prices very different outcomes. My work develops commercial valuation logic, rather than a formal valuation opinion.

A clear reason to acquire. The product should help the buyer do something it already cares about: launch sooner, fill a product gap, reach relevant customers, or add a difficult-to-reproduce capability. We need to explain why buying makes sense compared with building, partnering, or leaving the problem alone.

Buyers also need evidence they can examine. That may include a reproducible demo, customer and revenue records, usage, architecture, operating costs, and technical documentation. For AI products, model-provider dependencies, data rights, evaluations, and the distinction between proprietary work and third-party services deserve particular attention.

Finally, the transfer must be workable: ownership, contributor assignments, licenses, consents, customer obligations, and a realistic handover. We distinguish what works today from planned features, proposed integrations, and modeled outcomes before a buyer has to discover those limits independently.

I use an initial 60- or 90-day campaign as a working window where appropriate; the engagement agreement sets the actual term. That is time to prepare the asset, test buyer fit, conduct outreach, and develop serious conversations. It is not a promise to close within that period.

A transaction can take longer as product reviews, internal sponsorship, budget, approvals, diligence, commercial terms, and legal documents come together. A small purchase by a large company can move slowly if nobody owns the internal case. A smaller, well-capitalized operator with clear authority may sometimes be a more practical buyer.

We review progress against actual buyer responses and next steps. If the evidence points to a different buyer group, better preparation, or stopping the process, I will say so. Continuing should have a reason beyond simply extending the timetable.

A full sell-side mandate usually includes a defined period of exclusivity. I am committing personal time to product review, materials, research, and outreach before a buyer engages. A coordinated process also helps protect confidential information, keep buyer communication consistent, and avoid competing approaches to the same company.

Before we start, we identify existing buyer conversations and agree how they will be treated. The written agreement covers the engagement term, seller responsibilities, documented carve-outs, independently sourced transactions, termination rights, and any fee protection after the engagement ends.

Exclusivity should be something you understand before signing. Review the terms with counsel, including which transactions attract a fee and what obligations continue afterward. If a founder, investor, or another advisor already has a live conversation, tell me before new outreach begins.

I start with strategic fit and the practical ability to complete a worthwhile purchase: product priorities, customer overlap, integration requirements, acquisition behavior, a likely internal sponsor, and a credible path to a decision. A famous logo or a large balance sheet does not make a company the right buyer.

The route in may be a corporate development contact, product leader, CTO, founder, or an introduction from your own network. The depth of my relationships varies. I choose the buyer for fit, then work out the strongest way to approach them; an invitation to share opportunities is not the same as interest in your company.

Outreach is tailored and managed in staggered waves. Selected approaches may include a concise brief, Loom walkthrough, private acquisition page, or clearly labeled integration concept. We agree disclosure limits before sharing sensitive materials, and use real responses to refine the case and subsequent outreach.

No. A sale depends on a buyer wanting the opportunity, being able to act, completing diligence, and agreeing acceptable terms. Early-stage and commercially unproven software can be exceptionally difficult to sell. Even a capable advisor, distinctive technology, and serious conversations may produce no offers or completed transaction.

You are paying for the agreed work and committed time, with that possibility understood. My contribution is a specific acquisition case, relevant routes into buyers, tailored outreach, candid feedback, and persistent management of the process. I will distinguish polite replies, exploratory conversations, diligence, and an actual offer.

If interest is weak, we examine why: price, timing, strategic fit, implementation, or the buyer's preference to build. We may change the approach, strengthen the evidence, explore another sale scope, or stop. I would rather give you an accurate assessment than keep an unsupported expectation alive.

A pre-revenue M&A broker, M&A agent, or sell-side advisor helps establish whether a software product or IP asset has a credible acquisition case, identifies relevant buyers, prepares materials, coordinates private outreach, and represents the founder through commercial discussions, diligence, offers, negotiation, and closing.

Without a revenue history, the evidence may rest on a working implementation, technical depth, owned IP, a specialist team, or a capability a buyer could deploy sooner than it could build. We define what transfers, the dependencies a buyer would inherit, and what support the founder could provide afterward.

My practice also represents revenue-generating SaaS and AI companies, with a preferred range of approximately $1M–$5M ARR. I handle the advisory work personally, but the founder remains essential for demos, technical answers, timely decisions, and transition planning. Attorneys and other qualified professionals handle their respective specialist workstreams.

For new mandates, my usual structure is an upfront engagement fee plus a success fee. The upfront fee reserves my time and covers part of the product review, positioning, materials, research, and initial outreach. It pays for agreed work and committed time; the process can still end without an offer or a sale.

My success fees generally run from 15% to 25%, and can reach 40% for particularly demanding or risky assignments. The proposal reflects the likely transaction size, commercial proof, ownership and preparation, complexity, and how much initial work and risk I am carrying. Fully contingent engagements are rare and considered selectively.

We agree the fee calculation, any minimum, payment timing, and treatment of deferred consideration and earnouts in writing before starting. A lower upfront fee may mean a higher success fee. The engagement needs to leave you with an outcome worth pursuing after fees; I will explain the economics of the specific proposal.

My role is founder-side commercial advisory for qualifying private-company, software, product, and IP sale processes. It covers the acquisition case, buyer research, outreach, preparation for meetings, commercial negotiations, and coordination of diligence and next steps.

The engagement excludes capital raising, minority placements, custody of transaction funds, authority to bind either party, and legal, tax, accounting, securities, or formal valuation advice. Your attorney handles legal advice and transaction documents; qualified tax, accounting, and other professionals handle their respective workstreams.

The written agreement defines my scope for the particular assignment. Ownership, licensing, customer obligations, approvals, and transaction structure should be reviewed by the appropriate professionals. Bring existing buyer discussions and proposed documents to the initial review so responsibilities can be clear before the process progresses.